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Abstract
The public pension scheme has been an important element of the suc-
cessful model of 'Rhenish Capitalism' (social market economy) in post--
war Germany. On the one hand, the promise to guarantee status main-
tenance during retirement sustained the incentives of the labor market in
that it promoted individual effort and mobility. On the other hand, the
public pension scheme definitely contributed to the legitimization of
democratic politics because it corresponded to approved notions of social
justice. Not the least for these reasons, in the end, this branch of the
social insurance system developed with general approval from the
governing parties, the party in opposition, and the social partners. After
the legislation of the public pensions reform in 1989 (which became
effective in 1992) it was assumed that in Germany no further  structural 
reform should enter the political agenda during this century. Neverthe-
less, in 1997 another far-reaching reform proposal was enacted in 1997
(Rentenreform 1999). In the paper the background of the revived reform
debate, the (disputed) elements of the reform proposal(s), and the process
of compromise-building are analyzed. Special emphasis will be given to
the question of whether the conflictuous reform process and the still
ongoing debate indicate an end to the long-standing consensus between
the large political parties and between the social partners which has pre-
vailed in German pension politics so far and that would be, at the same
time, an expression and result of notable changes of the politico-economi-
cal conditions in Germany.
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51. Introduction
In 1989 a major public pension reform intended to keep the scheme viable in
view of an aging population passed the legislative bodies in Germany. Already
five years after this reform act (Rentenreform 1992) had gone into effect
another and again substantial reform package was enacted (Rentenreform
1999). Whereas all major public pension reforms from 1957 up to 1989 were
consented among the two large Volksparteien (CDU/CSU and SPD), at least
when it came to the final vote in parliament, this time the Social Democrats
opposed the reform plan, and the government parties had to overrule the
objection of the Bundesrat by an absolute majority vote in the Bundestag in
December 1997.
   Within the Western world, the 1983 Amendments to Social Security in the
U.S. were the first major reform predominantly meant to meet the challenge of
an aging population. The passing of the Rentenreform 1992 (Pension Reform
Act 1992; hereafter: PRA 1992) in Germany six years later preceded policy
changes in e.g. Sweden, Austria, Italy, and Finland which were brought about
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viability in the short and long run. Whereas the debate on Social Security in
the U.S. flared up again in the 1990s but has not resulted in legislative
changes yet, in Germany, the assessment prevailing among political actors
after the enactment of the PRA 1992 that a further structural reform had not
to be considered much before the year 2010 was revised very soon. What has
driven on the German government to pursue further changes although latest
demographic projections and estimates of the long-term financial prospects of
the pension scheme hardly differed from those of the late 1980s? What were
the elements of the Pension Reform Act 1999 (hereafter: PRA 1999) and of
reforms included in an omnibus bill enacted in 1996 that, furthermore,
prevented a continuation of the 
 
Grand Coalition  of the Christian parties
(CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats in pension policy and even led the SPD
to announce a reversal of central parts if the party would be back in
government after the federal election in autumn 1998? Why is, despite the
legislation of 1996 and 1997, the political debate on the future of the public
pension scheme1) still not fading? Have these developments altered popular
1     ) The 5public pension scheme 6 (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung) is made up of the
regionally organized schemes for blue-collar workers and the (one) scheme for
white-collar employees. They are identical in regard to contributions and benefits.
Furthermore included is the (much smaller) scheme for miners where contributions
and benefits are higher due to its 5bifunctional 6 objective. This scheme combines the
first and second (occupational) tier of old-age security. The public pension scheme
covers about 80 percent of the total labor force. Its expenditures (above 10 percent of
GDP during the 1990s) amount to roughly 70 percent of total spending on old-age
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of current tax revenues, are affected by the aging process in like manner as the
support for and confidence in the sustainability of the public pension
scheme? Do the latest reforms in Germany and the ongoing debate on
demands for more fundamental changes fit into a common pattern that
can be observed in several OECD countries differentiated by the type of
the existing pension system (Myles/Quadagno 1997)?
   The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that both the pension
reforms of 1996/1997 and the obviously no longer attainable consensus
in pension policy are linked to an ongoing reconceptualization of
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social market economy. Uni-
versal changes (like population aging and economic globalization)
combined with specifically national developments have triggered attempts
to reinterpret the attribute social  of Ger
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to substantiate this hypothesis and to partially answer the questions
raised above I will first turn to the interrelation of the most central public
pension reform of 1957 and the concept of social market economy and to
recent developments of the political economy putting strain on the
established consensus. Next, I will give a few information on the
demographic development in Germany and on the limited set of policy
changes by which a public pension scheme can be adjusted to population
aging (section 3.). In the fourth section the recent reforms, how they came
about and their impact are analyzed. The subsequent section (5.)
discusses whether the (continual) conflicts imply an end of the traditional
consensus in pension policymaking, and in the concluding section I deal
with the question whether the time is ripe for radical changes. Due to the
interwoven structure of the German social insurance state it is not
unproblematic to study the development of public pension policy in
isolation. Thus, where necessary I will take into consideration the broader
context of social policy-making in Germany and interaction effects.
2. Rhenish Capitalism and Public Pensions
 
 Trajectories Leading to Consensus
German capitalism  is one distinct variant (or even the prototype) of what
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-Armack 1950) that
reconciled the basic positions of economic and political liberalism,
democratic socialism and christian conservatism, and its adoption
facilitated a stable welfare state consensus. This model of economic and
societal order encompassed two complementary goals: Firstly, it aims at
protection of the market, i.e. to establish and maintain functioning
competition on all markets for the sake of economic efficiency. At the
unfunded public pension scheme (Färber 1997).
same time, it secondly aspires protection from the market when labor and
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life chances according to approved standards of social justice. The shared
belief of parties, associations and other political actors that by pursuing
the twofold objective of corresponding institutional arrangements it would
be possible to increase economic efficiency and ensure social stability and
integration facilitated a willingness to compromise. The conflict between
economic policy and social policy which agonized development during the
Weimar Republic was transformed into reconcilable positions. Further
enhanced by the results of the beginning 
 
economic miracle  it promoted
an understanding to be (socially responsible)
 
stakeholders  in a positive-sum game rather than to act as 
 
veto players 
with short time horizon. Of course, the general orientation toward
compromise and consensus does not mean that there were no disputes
over the various steps of labor and social policy development or that party
politics was absent.
   The public pension reform 1957 is a case in point: It was controversial
until the final vote in the Bundestag (Hockerts 1980). Nevertheless, this
reform act (1) became the 
 
cornerstone  of post-war social policy reform
and stands out as its most popular element, and (2) it paved the way for a
broad consensus on pension policy that lasted until the early 1990s.2)
Brought about during the 
 
hot phase of the Cold War  this reform contri-
buted to the support for the new economic order of 
 
social market economy 
and further consolidated the legitimacy of the restored democratic system
in general. It could develop these stabilization effects (apart from helping
the CDU/CSU to win the absolute majority of votes at the subsequent
federal election) because (a) benefits went up immediately (by more than
60 percent in spring of 1957) so that 
 
being old  was considerably less
synonymous with 
 
being poor , (b) rather than providing a floor of
retirement income, earnings-related pensions were actually made a wage
replacement that was expected to rise to a higher ratio, (c) pensioners
were given continuous participation in annual wage growth,3) (d) the
2     ) It became the 5cornerstone 6 because an encompassing welfare state reform
failed after the incomprehensive structure of the German Sozialstaat had been
reinstated and new programs were added and others reformed one by one. The
Social Democracts were the protagonists of an encompassing reform but
gradually departed from it when it turned out that corresponding demands
were not very appealing and could not win a majority even within the party
itself (von Berlepsch 1991). The pension reform bill they introduced in 1956
was largely in line with the one the government finally presented, and since
there was no longer a fundamental dissent the Social Democracts pushed the
government to consider further liberalizing provisions (Hockerts 1980: 342-63)
as they had repeatedly done already before World War I (Benöhr 1981).
3     ) Despite a series of ad hoc decisions on benefit indexation notably after
1976, in the long run, both net benefits and net wages increased by roughly 125
percent in real terms between 1957 and 1995 (see Table 1, below). One
reform met the desire for 
 
security  (Kaufmann 1973; Braun 1978) and,
finally, (e) embedded principles corresponded to prevailing intuitions of
distributive justice (Kohli 1987). It is thus not unfounded to argue, as
Nullmeier/Rüb (1994) do, that the public pension scheme as it was
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(sozialstaatlicher Republikanismus - Nullmeier/Rüb 1994: 68-71) since it
accomplished political integration via an institutionally constituted
lifetime participation in economic growth on the basis of individual effort.
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the contribution to the lasting legitimacy of democracy in the Federal
Republic and to the political stability of the public pension scheme itself
as it enjoyed almost unanimous support from the social partners, political
elites and the public.
   Indeed, that productivist design, a seemingly strict link between benefit
level and work merit, was perfectly compatible with maintaining labor
market incentives and thus met em
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185-90). The removal of basic security elements from benefit calculation
(Döring 1990)4) and the prospect of receiving a comfortable 
 
retirement
wage  reflecting lifetime work effort undoubtedly induced employees to
strive for upward occupational mobility and a long, uninterrupted
employment career as well as it sustained their willingness to pay
compulsory contributions. Moreover, conveying the insight that a socially
appreciated and an individually beneficial life course coincide made other
modes to gain the means of subsistence comparatively inferior and
contributed to the growth of labor supply.
   Furthermore, a relatively high replacement ratio (coming at an initially
low and always uniform 
 
surcharge 
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advantage of linking pension benefits to wage development is that during
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i.e. the year of entering retirement is of no importance. At the same time, this
mode of indexation largely avoids budget problems in case of stagflation, a
problem U.S. Social Security ran into almost immediately after introducing the
cost-of-living adaptation in 1975.
4     ) The payment of a (however insufficient) 5minimum pension 6 (topped up by
earnings-
related elements) was the main reason for federal grants to the (blue-collar)
pension scheme since 1891. After 1957 those federal grants out of general tax
=ﬀ8J^8<M);\897sKnﬃX&;ﬃAP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Sﬃ8<Mfkﬀ? ture in the late 1950s)
were meant to cover non-contributory elements of pension benefits (foremost,
credits for time spent in military service, education, unemployment etc.) but not
specified as concrete reimbursements, rather, were (loosely) linked to the
development of gross wages until 1992. The lump sum subsidy was (and still is)
=ﬀ8JOEKn=nk!8ﬀk K7 A Hf8 7JAVKnAV8La 7p:9X9M!A=@?N;>Ac?ZX9MmAJX ex ante risk redistributions and further
interpersonal redistributions occuring in a social insurance scheme.
contribution rate remained unchanged at 14 percent until 1968) relieved
the employers from selective demands for occupational pensions to
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attract and motivate workers when they 
 
decommodified  labor
themselves.5) This meant an advantage for the unions as well: They were
not forced to burden collective bargaining with the supplementary
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pensioners were made implicit allies. Due to index-linking of pension
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Exactly this connection was made a strong argument in the debate before
the enactment because one feared that unions would be encouraged to
pursue an 
 
expansive  wage policy causing wage-price spirals. However,
those objections proved unsubstantiated. Unions were willing and able to
pursue a coordinated wage policy largely in line with productivity growth
and without triggering strong inflationary pressure. In macroeconomic
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-firm mobility by the 
 
millstone  of
hard-to-
portable occupational pensions, predominantly public earnings-related
retirement benefits could help to optimize the allocation of labor.
   Finally, the (individual
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pension scheme was promoted by the fact that easy access to disability
pensions and early retirement, provisions which both were further
liberalized in the 1970s, provided an opportunity to 
 
rejuvenate 
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workforce when older and less productive workers could be smoothly
referred to those options because, compared to continuing work until the
age of 65, the benefit reduction was small. The generosity of these
provisions became salient after 1974 when they were strategically used to
shed surplus workers. Regularly, unions and works councils (as well as
the younger workforce) supported this 
 
externalization  strategy which
resulted in a substantially declined labor force participation rate of
workers in the age bracket 55 to 64.
   There are two further and somewhat interrelated factors to be taken
into account for the explanation of the stable consensus that prevailed in
public pension policy.
(1) The reform of 1957 meant the decisive step toward a pay-as-you-go
financing of public pensions albeit the final step, the transition to a small
5     ) In West Germany, hardly ever more than half of private sector employees,
predominantly those in larger firms, have been covered by occupational pension
plans (and a considerably smaller percentage of elderly actually receives those
benefits) and, since the mid-1970s, the trend in coverage was clearly
downward. For most recipients the actual level of this supplementary
retirement income is low whereas a small percentage of former (white-collar)
employees, i.e. those with earnings at or above the ceiling on contributions,
receive comparatively high amounts (Bundesregierung 1997: 122-4; Ruppert
1997; Schmähl 1997).
contingency reserve, took place in 1969. The debate on this central
element of reform went along with the rise in the generational compact 
metaphor. It denotes the relations of solidaristic exchange as a self-repro-
ducing cooperative solution based on serial reciprocity. But, above all, the
fictitious generational compact is a conceptual arrangement to overcome
the temporal cleavage of contributing to and receiving benefits from the
pension system (Zacher 1987: 726-9; 1991: 36-41). The time horizon of
the insured might cover about sixty years 
 
 from entering employment un-
til termination of benefit payment. For the legitimacy of the system
institutional trust is thus crucial, i.e. the insured have every reason to
expect security  because the scheme is stable and reliable in the long-run.
Since an unfunded pension scheme has to be guaranteed by the state the
redemption of claims to benefits earned during employment is ultimately
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(Lindbeck 1994) comes from democratic politics which would damage
their security expectations. Constitutional protection (granting claims a
property rights status) and institutional design (separated funds,
self-administration, automatic adjustment formulas and further pre-
commitments) are means to insulate the system from political risks (Dia-
mond 1997).
   However, the long-term horizon of the insured diverges from that of
democratic politics: Institutional stability has to be organized as a
permanent process, and a matured, unfunded pension scheme is
particularly sensitive to economic and demographic fluctuations which
occasionally require short-term adaptations. The strong inclination of all
actors involved in this policy arena to consent stems from the problem to
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dynamic environment and, at the same time, sustaining institutional
trust should be accomplished most easily if (a) the political elites are
consensually committed to the present institution, (b) rule changes aspire
to incorporate a long-term, consistent perspective and thus occur at
infrequent intervals and, if they are deemed necessary, (c) are
unanimously concluded so that legislated modifications will be sustained
regardless of a change in government.
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strategies (Weaver 1986; see also Pierson 1997) is useful to explain why
the inclination to consent prevails in different choice situations: It is, of
course, somewhat unproblematic to reach a consensus between
government and opposition when an expansion of the scheme is at stake.
The expectation of the opposition to be rewarded at the next election
when actively supporting a liberalization of entitlements might even
temptate the party to outbid government proposals. Only an unfunded
pension scheme permits such an opportunistic behavior because the
costs of promising better benefits accrue in a more or less distant future.
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reached its climax in 1972 (Hockerts 1992) and subsequently, in the
wake of the oil-price shock crisis, triggered rule instability  as a politically
induced risk.
   If retrenchments
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take the opposition on board  in order to share the blame because the
elderly and those close to retirement age make up a large part of the
electorate (in 1993, 33.7 percent of citizens entitled to vote were 55 years
and older in Germany). It might be wise not to refuse cooperation because
the opposition cannot be interested to work on a delayed legislation after
it had returned to government. Trying to influence the direction and
magnitude of retrenchments which are generally conceived as inevitable
can be beneficial (and possibly opens up the chance to claim credit for
having warded off the worst ), all the more, since attempts to save on
expenditure have to be accompanied by phasing-in or phasing-out
provisions in order to give those cohorts affected a chance to individually
accomodate to enacted changes. These provisions reduce the immediate
savings effect but can be more generous the earlier a reform is passed. It
means a further incentive not to delay retrenchments because the
ﬁ% f$ 013  ﬁ>(<0ﬁ
tion of policy stability is best preserved if actual
impairments will occur far in the future and predominantly affect insured
of age-groups presently less concerned with retirement.
(2) Pension policy is a complicated and very technical matter and thus
preponderant
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comprehensive evaluation of the impact of reform proposals requires to
involve independent professional expertise and the knowledge of the
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a small dense policy network had been established which was capable of
largely insulating the policy development from outside interferences. All
actors involved in actual decision-making, including representatives from
both social partners 
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committed to the existing institution and its objectives and principles.
This grand coalition  of defenders, aware of the lock-in effects  as well as of
the political success, jointly warded off proposals which were
non-incremental and would represent a break in continuity. Instead, they
preferred technical solutions within the given framework which, fostered
by mutual learning processes due to close interactions and commonly
shared knowledge, increased the likelihood to be acceptable to all of them.
Such a cooperative strategy implies (a) that compromised and largely
conservative  reform packages promote the perception of time consistency
on part of the public and (b) that the politics of pension policy was highly
de-politicized and, what is especially true of the PRA 1992,
de-parlamentarized (Hinrichs 1993: 15-6).6)
   Therefore, it remains to be answered what has changed after 1989 that
hampered the continuance of the traditional consensus stretching well
beyond public pension policy and of which, for the time being, the
introduction of the long-term care insurance in 1994 was its last
manifestation (Götting et al. 1994).
 
 Developments Bringing Pensions Back on the Political Agenda
Unification of West and East Germany was the most important factor
posing current problems of financing the public pension scheme. The
Renten-Überleitungsgesetz which unanimously passed in 1991 extended
the West German system (including the PRA 1992) to the five new states.
It contained several temporary provisions intended to smoothen the
transformation process. As long as those pension supplements have not
melted away they imply considerable West-East transfers out of
contribution revenues and are causing a higher contribution rate (in
overall Germany) than otherwise necessary.7) The dramatic decline of
gainful employment from an extremely high level in East Germany and a
notable reduction of covered employment in West Germany after the end
of the unification boom  led to a concomitant rise in registered
unemployment. The labor market development thus implied a loss of
revenues for all social insurance schemes and required further increases
of the contribution rate(s).8) Additional expenditure arose because higher
6     ) For an excellent analysis of the pension policy-making process in
Germany, see Nullmeier/Rü b (1993); on the pension  policy community , see also
von Winter (1997: 384-400). The consensus-governed style of policymaking
prevailing in U.S. Social Security until the 1970s and the strong role of the
program administration in that process (Derthick 1979) resembles the German
case.
7     ) Regarding public pensions, a somewhat paradoxical result of the
complete  institution transfer  to East Germany, carried out under time pressure
and meant to avoid repercussions on the West German institutions, is the ex
post :ﬀXnMﬁl?=I2KnAc?hX&MTX&l>AcHf8 lZX9= IW8J=a 7g8JIYSE_cX&B[I28JMﬃAKLMfk OE8JMfkE8V=SﬃXn_N?h: BpHf8VM2A Hf8
average benefit of male and notably of female pensioners in East Germany is al-
ready lifted above (and, for some time, will remain above) the West German level
(Bundesregierung 1998: 92) and because of that considerable inter-regional
transfers of contribution revenues are taking place.
8     ) The unemployment insurance actually transfers contributions on behalf
of unemployed beneficiaries to the public pension scheme, the statutory health
and the long-term care insurance on the basis of 80 percent of notional gross
earnings which are used to calculate unemployment benefits. The statutory
sickness funds pay contributions to the public pension scheme, the long-term
care and unemployment insurance for recipients of sickness benefits based on
the same formula. The public pension scheme transfers contributions to the
open unemployment was prevented as a growing number of older
long-term unemployed (in both parts of the country, but relatively more in
East Germany) entered retirement at age 60. While in the late 1980s
annually about 50,000 older unemployed made use of this pathway into
retirement the figure rose to nearly 300,000 in 1995. In that year 37
percent of all pension benefits granted to males in unified Germany were
due to previous unemployment (VDR 1997: 52). Beside reducing the
number of contributors, early retirement causes additional expenditure at
the year of entry and also during subsequent years if the standard
retirement age is taken as a yardstick. Finally, the share of employment
liable to contribution payments is shrinking due to an accelerated erosion
of the standard employment relationship . Although empirical estimates
differ widely it is uncontested that the number of marginal part-time
workers (Bogai/Classen 1998) and of false self-employed  (one-man busi-
ness having only one customer which, very often, is the former employer)
has grown during the 1990s. At present, these legal types of contribution
evasion  intensify the revenue problems of social insurance schemes
whereas, in future, they might push up the number of elderly with
insufficient entitlements.
Table 1: Social Expenditure and Public Pension Financing in Germany
Year Social Ex-
penditure
in Percent
of GDP
(1)
Combined
Contribution
Rate to
Social
Insurance
Schemes
(2)
Public
Pen-
sion
Expen-
diture in
Percent of
GDP
(3)
Net Standard
Pension in
1991
DEM/in % of
Real Net Aver-
age Earnings
(4)
Contribution Rate
to the Public Pen-
sion Scheme
(Upper
Earnings Ceiling;
DEM/month)
(5)
long-term care insurance and the statutory sickness funds on the basis of
individual pensions, i.e. half of the contribution is deducted from a  gross pen-
sion  while the  8I/S_ZX9B8<=ﬀ79a\7JHfKn=ﬀ8  constitutes an additional expenditure of the
public pension scheme. It is quite obvious that more persons paying
contributions out of actual earnings is advantageous for the financial situation
of all social insurance schemes and, in tendency, imply lower contribution
rates.
1957
1960
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1992
1995
1996
1997
1998
21.7
26.0
33.4
32.2
31.4
29.0
32.4
34.0
34.9
34.4
21.6
22.4
26.5
30.5
32.4
35.1
35.5
36.8
39.3
40.8
42.0
42.1
 6.4
 7.7
 9.8
 9.6
 9.5
 9.0
 9.3
10.4
10.6
10.5
 8,868/70.2
 9,497/66.4
14,447/64.6
17,228/66.4
19,852/70.6
19,233/71.9
20,412/67.5
20,458/68.2
20,354/71.5
20,213/69.7
14.0 (  750)
14.0 (  850)
17.0 (1,800)
18.0 (2,100)
18.0 (4,200)
19.0 (5,400)
18,7 (6,300)
17.7 (6,800)
18.6 (7,800)
19.2 (8.000)
20.3 (8,200)
20.3 (8,400)
Sources: (1) = BMAS 1998: 20-4 [figures not comparable to OECD calculations; 1997
figure estimated]; (2) = BMAS 1994: 270; BMAS 1998: 519; (3) = BMAS 1998: 40-4; (4)
= VDR 1997: 206 [  standard pension  is based on 45 years of employment at always
average earnings; all figures relate to West Germany]; (5) = VDR 1997: 209 and 211
[1992 and after: contribution assessment ceiling valid in West Germany].
All in all, unification and the labor market development have considerably
contributed to the increase in the combined contribution rate to all social
insurance schemes from 35.1 percent in 1990 to 42.1 percent in 1997
(Table 1). About three percentage points of this rise are due to West-East
transfers within the public pension scheme and unemployment insur-
ance. In 1996, when the new long-term care insurance was fully
implemented and a contribution rate to this scheme of 1.7 percent was
levied the symbolic benchmark of 40 percent was breached for the first
time. This development and the publication of a report by the Prognos
institute, commissioned to evaluate the financial prospects of the public
pension scheme, predicting a combined contribution rate within the range
of 48.6 and 52.7 percent in 2030 (Prognos 1995: K-6) pushed the issue of
non-wage labor costs into the focus of attention, especially since it was
put into the interpretative framework of globalization .9) Due to the
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9     ) Virtually, for employers the split between direct wages and non-wage
labor costs is purely artificial. They are interested in total labor costs (whereas
for the competitiveness of a national economy or a certain industry the unit
labor costs, which take into account labor productivity, are important). But
rising contribution rates to social insurance schemes represent a problem for
employers as they imply a mandated increase in total labor costs determined
outside collective bargaining. Employers thus face the challenge to either have
this increment being taken into consideration during subsequent bargaining
rounds or to accomplish higher product prices at the market. A third alternative
to offset the cost push is to enhance labor-saving rationalization measures.
on the level of employment the actual contribution rate to the public
pension scheme (as well as to the other social insurance branches) was
generally deemed as too high already.
   Within this context the issue of benefits regarded as  alien  to a social
insurance scheme (versicherungsfremde Leistungen) gained
unprecedented prominence in the debate on how to curb the seemingly
incessant rise in contribution rates. It was discussed either to eliminate
those benefits altogether or, if considered as genuine tasks of the general
public, to shift the financing to (preferably indirect) taxation. Although the
definition of  non-contributory benefits  (to what extent they represent the
essence of a social insurance scheme) and thus the volume of
 mis-financed  expenditure are still disputed, in principle, CDU/CSU, SPD
and the social partners agreed to lower non-wage labor costs through
increased fiscalization of social insurance expenditure. Independent of
whether  globalization  means an actual and exogenous threat or not,
interpreting obvious problems of unemployment and social security
4C  
),01 ,+'%' .f    *0
	ﬃ ,1'ﬁ>(j +( +  f+*
$\
01  (3ﬁﬃ<ﬁ>
E<1ﬁf((
for reform although they differed over the direction and magnitude.
   Moreover, the quarrels preceding the introduction of an unfunded
long-term care insurance enhanced the debate on the consequences of
population aging. Strongly pushed by the mass media  generational equity 
which, since the early 1980s, has dominated the dispute on the future of
Social Security in the U.S., finally arrived as an issue in Germany.10)
Calculations of the  internal rate of return  of contributions to the public
pension scheme had been almost absent until the end of the 1980s but
after that were carried out more frequently and received much more
attention than before. Quite unsurprisingly, they show that, if compelled
to further contribute to an unfunded scheme, each birth cohort will make
a  worse deal  than the preceding one.11) Independent of whether
10     ) The implications of demographic change are a most suitable theme to
put the public into a state of uncertainty because the mass media could and
did portray them in most vivid manner as dramatic discontinuities (grave
intergenerational inequities) and universal threats ( war between generations ). It
was thus possible to create a high degree of attention and to influence the
political agenda setting (Bräuninger et al. 1998). On the  career  of this issue in
the U.S. and Canada, see Cook et al. 1994.
11     ) The latest one was carried out by the Institut für Altersvorsorge which is
a subsidiary of, among others, the Deutsche Bank (Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, No. 153/July 6, 1998).  A social insurance scheme, however, is not a
state-run life insurance solely aiming at individual equity and a maximum
=ﬀ8JAc;>=@MrXnMrX&Mf8[a 7 :LX&MﬁAc=@?N; tions. Rather, it pursues, in every respect, politically
shaped goals of old-age income security and political risk balancing when the
concepts of commutative and distributive justice are combined (Hinrichs 1997:
13). Due to the complex benefit package a public pension scheme provides and
to which no real private alternative exists those calculations and comparisons
are rather meaningless  apart from methodological problems (Green Book 1993:
(alternative or additional) payments into private, fully funded schemes
would actually prove more profitable, highlighting the consequences of
the aging process in regard to generational equity and possible
macro-social tensions between generations had, at least, three effects: (a)
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lity to guarantee income security
at old age remained high, like in the U.S., it increasingly became at odds
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priate benefit level (Reno/Friedland 1997). Influenced by the ongoing
public debate, trust in the reliability of the existing scheme dropped to an
all-time low.12) (b) More often, political elites, notably the younger ones,
emphasized that in order to preserve the generational compact the
younger cohorts must not be encumbered with the consequences of
population aging in an unbalanced manner. Different from the PRA 1992,
an intergenerationally equitable distribution of this burden was explictily
mentioned as a goal of the PRA 1999 (BMAS 1997a: 6; 1997b: 3; Blü m
1998). (c) Within the two Volksparteien (CDU/CSU and SPD) the pension
issue surpassed a level of attention that made it impossible for the
respective policy experts to keep down the discourse from flourishing (see
also Nullmeier/Rü b 1993: 348). With ranks no longer closed in unani-
mous defence of the existing scheme, dissenting voices favoring radical
changes became more frequent and influential than before.
3. Population Aging and Pension Financing
It should be sufficient to limit the description of the ongoing process of
population aging which implies a serious challenge to the future viability
of existing old-age security systems to a few facts. As the combined result
of fallen fertility rates and greater longevity the working-age population
(15 to 65 years of age) will decline while the elderly share (65 years and
older) will grow: The elderly share in Germany stood at 15.2 percent in
1993. According to the latest projections, it will rise to 19.3 percent in
2010, slightly decline to 18.4 percent in 2020, amount to 25.3 percent in
2030 and 27.5 percent in 2040 (Sommer 1994). When it comes to the
financing of old-age pensions as well as health and long-term care of
which the elderly are the main consumers the elderly dependency ratio  is
1293-1306) or that the existence of a large volume of private intergenerational
transfers (cash and in-kind) invalidates the concept of  intergenerational equity 
as such (Börsch-Supan 1997: 13-4). Notwithstanding those objections, they
entail a serious threat to the contiMﬁ;fKLMb:L8xX&l-S;>_ ?c: SU8<M,7<?hX&M 7[:JHf8JI28[79| a  M\:98
generational inequity is acknowledged as a problem, then the system loses
legitimacy and the inevitable solution must be privatizaAc?hX&MfaLsgXXLk1B w1y)| } P ~ D
12     ) Inter alia, this statement is substantiated by the results of the following
studies: Föste/Janßen 1997; Jung 1995; Köcher 1996; Rinne/Wagner 1995;
Roller 1996; see also Mau 1998.
more important because, under almost all circumstances, the population
of employable age has to carry the elderly  burden . Comparing OECD
projections, Germany will top the  geriatric league table  in 2030: The
estimated ratio for Germany is 49.2 (USA: 36.8; Japan: 44.5; OECD
Europe: 39.2   OECD 1996: 102). However, it has been demonstrated that
pure demographically induced expenditure growth of social security
schemes will considerably fall behind the rise in the elderly share or the
elderly dependency ratio (Fachinger/Rothgang 1997).
Figure 1: Measures to Cope with the Effects of Population Aging on the
Financing of Public Pension Schemes
I.Measures concerning current/future contributors
1.increasing the contribution rate
2.utilizing parts of an increased contribution rate to build up a (private or public)
fund reserve
3.broadening the contribution base
a)making hitherto non-covered employed liable for mandatory insurance
b)increasing the ceiling of earnings subject to contributions
4.differentiating the contribution rate according to the number of children
}
D$:9Kn_ :V;ﬃ_ZKLAC?MﬁOp8JI S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terest revenue, depriciation)
II.Measures concerning current/future beneficiaries
1.suspending automatic benefit indexation and/or changing the indexing formula
2.raising the standard retirement age
3.increasing benefit reductions in case of early retirement up to actuarial level
4.changing the benefit formula
5.tightening the rules of eligibility for disability pensions
6.reducing/eliminating derivative/auxiliary benefits
III.Measures concerning the state's engagement
directly:
1.increasing/introducing subsidies out of general taxation to public pension
schemes
indirectly:
2.intensifying population policy (fertility, migration)
3.increasing the employment ratio (reducing the unemployment level, facilitating
higher female labor force participation)
4.promoting investments in physical and human capital to facilitate higher pro-
ductivity growth rates
   Since population aging in industrialized countries has been
acknowledged as a common although unequally serious challenge to the
future viability of existing old-age security systems various international
organizations (IMF, OECD, World Bank) and national experts have
proposed reform measures, ranging from incremental adaptations to radi-
cal changes. Almost ever a call for early action is added. Making use of
the narrow window of opportunity would to allow people time to plan and
adjust, in particular to changes in pensions, and to attain to an
intergenerationally fairer distribution of the financial burden of aging less
painfully (see e.g. OECD 1996: 24; 1998: 18; Chand/Jaeger 1996: 32). If
one examines incremental changes within an unfunded, mandatory, con-
tributory, earnings-related social insurance scheme as it is in place in
Germany, Austria or the United States (or in public second-tier schemes
like the earnings-related ATP in Sweden) there is only a limited repertoire
of levers which can be applied to meet the challenge of a declining
worker-pensioner ratio (Figure 1; see also Weaver 1998; OECD 1998).13)
However, due to policy feedbacks of existing programs not all measures
are immediately accessible, some are limited in their financial impact, and
others will develop their effects only over a longer time span.
   Among the policy responses affecting the present and future
working-age generation, a gradual but ultimately substantial rise in the
contribution rate (I.1.) in order to pay unchanged benefits to more and
increasingly long-lived retirees is exactly what one intends to avoid. The
reasons are obvious: Ad
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might induce detrimental employment effects and set in motion a spiral of
a declining number of covered employees followed by the need for again
raised contribution rates. If overall taxation is perceived as having an
upper limit a rising contribution rate might crowd out or preclude addi-
tional public spending on newly arising social needs or is increasing
budget competition among existing welfare state programs. A rising
0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ability to make individual provisions for old age. Related to this, one can
furthermore assume that being obliged to ever larger contribution
payments while not becoming entitled to correspondingly higher benefits
would not be accepted by the mandatorily insured and lead to evasive
behavior   apart from equity reasons if only the current and future
working-age generations are negatively affected by the aging process.
Contingent upon whether the present contribution rate is regarded as an
13     ) The classification of policy changes either affecting workers liable to
contributions, pensioners or the state is, of course, not clear-cut: In
longitudinal perspective, contributors become pensioners and might well be
affected twice, and, regularly, those who contribute to a social insurance
scheme are taxpayers as well. Nevertheless, only if the revenue side, i.e. the
relief of mandatorily covered workers, is disregarded and solely the retirement
phase is focused on, all measures concerning present and future retirees
(Figure 1, II.1 to II.6) appear as  retrenchments .
independent variable to be kept constant (like in the U.S.) or as a
dependent variable permitted to rise to a higher level the scope (and
direction) of additional coping strategies varies.
   The potential policy changes listed in Figure 1 cannot be dealt with in
detail here, not the least, because they might come in a number of
variants, given the institutional peculiarities of social insurance schemes
in place in industrialized countries. For example, changes of the benefit
formula (II.4.) open up a wide array of possibilities to save on expenditure
either across-the-board or targeted at certain categories of insured when
the replacement ratio of newly retired beneficiaries is lowered. The
concrete options for change are largely contingent upon the construction
of the applied benefit formulas which differ widely across countries (as do
 
standard  replacement ratios; OECD 1988: 67-74).
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beyond a direct involvement through an expanded utilization of general
taxation to finance public pensions. Intensifying population policy (III.2)
could be one of the indirect state strategies to improve the financial
prospects of public pension schemes. Whereas nowhere in the Western
world pronatalist measures have been overly successful and produced a
permanent rise in fertility rates, higher net immigration could partially
compensate for birth rates below unity and, under certain circumstances,
actually prove beneficial to public pension financing (however, it is an
hopeless strategy if one would aspire to halt population aging as such, i.e.
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face very substantial demographic shifts over the next decades can be
expected to easily attract migrants from regions with lower per-capita
income. The one-off benefit is that working-age immigrants have no
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system. It is not the old-age ratio pure and simple which is crucial for a
pay-as-you-
go funded pension scheme. What matters most is the worker-pensioner
ratio. Hence, enlarging the numerator through lower registered
unemployment or fewer 
 
discouraged workers  imply additional contribu-
tion revenues out of actual earnings (III.3) but, subsequently, higher
entitlements.
   Very often it is overlooked that even if there is only a moderate annual
productivity growth, gradually rising contribution rates do not result in
declining net real wages (Prognos 1995). This is not to say that a growing
 
tax wedge  will effect no economically negative impact, but if productivity
growth can be enhanced due to more investments in physical and human
capital the resulting income growth will make the 
 
burden  of aging felt less
grave (III.4.). Provided that the present working-age generation intensifies
efforts at future-orientated investments which will facilitate income
growth for subsequent generations potential intergenerational tensions on
the macro-level might be moderated. Foremost economists who complain
about a too low national savings rate and thus demand a transition to
partial or full advance-funding of pensions might retreat to those
arguments.
   I will now turn to the mix of policy changes that has been chosen in
Germany over the last decade and that aimed at to enhance the financial
viability of the public pension scheme.
4. Public Pension Reform: From 1989 to 1997
In 1989 when the contribution rate stood at 18.7 percent it was expected
that, compared to the current law, the PRA 1992 would reduce its future
rise by roughly one half: Instead of a projected rise to 24.9 percent in
2010 the effects of the reform package should lower the figure to 21.6
percent, and for 2030 the contribution rate should amount to 26.9
percent instead of 36.3 percent (Schmähl 1993: 47). It meant that a
further gradual increase in the contribution rate was accepted. The
difference to the 
 
current law  projections mainly stemmed from three
changes (for details see Hinrichs 1993; Schmähl 1992, 1993): (a) Accord-
ing to the new adjustment formula current benefits are no longer indexed
to the growth of gross wages of all employees but are automatically
(without approval by the Bundestag) adapted to the pre
0(ﬁ $ +	U(
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wage development (average gross earnings minus income tax and em-
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tions). This new formula be-
came part of a self-regulating mechanism ensuring a stable net standard
pension level (70 percent) as well as, via the benefit adjustment rate,
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cally (or otherwise) induced
changes of the contribution rate(s) and income tax codes.14) (b) Federal
grants were in
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The main reason given was higher spending resulting from the extension
of child care credits. Due to the working of the self-regulating mechanism
the subsidy makes up a constant share in future. (c) Except for seriously
handicapped persons, in 2012 all provisions to retire before age 65
without benefit reduction were scheduled to phase out. Beginning in
2001, retiring earlier will imply a permanent deduction of 3.6 percent for
each year below the standard retirement age which amounts to about two
thirds of an actuarially fair adjustment. The timing when this provision
should start to phase in was the most disputed issue between the govern-
ment parties and the Social Democrats when they strived for an in-
ter-party compromise on the reform bill.
   The PRA 1992 was not only meant as a timely attempt to adapt to a
shifting age struc-
14     )  Participation  also implies that pensioners subsequently benefit from
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pensions.
ture. Moreover, it was intended to call a halt to non-systematic changes
(arbitrarily fixing the contribution rate, selective retrenchments, fiddling
about with the indexation formula) which, since the second half of the
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problems resulting from risen unemployment and which had weakened
institutional trust on part of the public. The condition of pension politics
two years after the implementation of the PRA 1992 can be read off from a
publication of the peak organization of German em
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(BDA 1994). Only the public pension scheme was almost spared from
demands to substantially scale back and reorganize the German welfare
state, and it was expressed what was largely common understanding of
all actors involved in public pension policy: The PRA 1992 was praised as
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were retained. Despite the favorable effects on the contribution rate
further action was regarded as indispensible to keep in check an
unbearable rise after 2010. Hence, around the turn of the century the
search for an appropriate reform package would have to start and, as
before, a broad political consensus should be aspired. All proposals which
would do away with central features of the existing scheme
(advance-funding, basic pensions) were firmly rejected. The next pension
reform going into effect at around 2010 should be another reform within
the system (BDA 1994: 29-40).
   In view of rising unemployment figures the unions launched the
 
alliance for work  (Bündnis für Arbeit) in January 1996. Among others, the
government, the unions and the employers agreed upon to force down the
combined contribution rate to the social insurance schemes below the 40
percent benchmark. As a kind of 
 
emergency measure  it was decided to
discontinue the pathway into retirement at the age of 60 after a minimum
of one year of unemployment and to replace it with a model of
 
elderly part-time work  (Altersteilzeit). Due to the almost 
 
exploding  intake
during the early 1990s the current provision had become very costly for
the pension scheme and the unemployment insurance (see above). The
new model shifts the costs to a larger extent to employers and older
workers viz. subsequent retirees15) but the aspired savings do not accrue
15     ) It is not required that older workers really work  part-time . Collective
agreements may provide that, at the age of 55 at the earliest, they continue to
work full-time for half of the years until retirement is possible and work zero
hours for the second half of these years (the age when, after working part-time
for a minimum of 24 months or after one year of unemployment, retirement
without permanent benefit reduction is possible increases to 65 until end of
2001, i.e. that year when, according to the PRA 1992, it should start to phase
in). However, earnings are continuously based on the reduced working hours,
but the employer has to pay contributions to the public pension scheme on the
basis of 90 percent of full-time earnings and, additionally, must to top up the
 part-time   Xn= ,8@=ﬀa 7 89K9=@Mﬁ?MﬁO 7 B K AVK  -free supplement of 20 percent. The
unemployment insurance refunds these expenses if a previously unemployed
worker or a former apprentice is hired. Taking into account that supplement
immediately, rather, will materialize gradually.
   The 
 
alliance for work  collapsed when the government (supported by the
employers) started to dismantle dismissal protection and to attack the
100 percent level of sick pay which the unions regarded as a central
working-class achievement. Without consent from the unions and the
Social Democrats further changes concerning the public pension scheme
were included in the Wachstums- und Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz
(WFG) that was enacted in 1996. The most important ones included in
this omnibus bill are the following: Periods of education after the age of
17 are credited at a lower value and for not more than three years. The
PRA 1992 had already stipulated a reduction to a maximum of seven
years so that the new provision meant a further loss of four years which
implies a considerable reduction of the entitlements of university
graduates.16) Furthermore, three instead of the first four years of covered
employment when earnings are regularly low are revalued to a level of 75
percent of average earnings (formerly: 90 percent). The phasing-out
periods of options to retire before age 65 without permanent benefit
reduction are cut down. In particular, the accelerated increase in the
standard retirement age for women (from 60 to 65 until the end of 2004)
was vehemently opposed by the unions and the Social Democrats. When
the government, moreover, announced to set up a 
 
pension reform
commission  to investigate further savings measures in order to attain its
target of a total contribution rate below 40 percent the Social Democrats
refused the invitation to participate. Its social policy spokesman declared
the consensus in pension policy (Rentenkonsens) as being over. On most
issues the proposals of the govern
*(3
 
pension reform commission 
(BMAS 1997a) differed from those of the SPD which had set up an own
commission (SPD 1997). The subsequent legislative process went a
 
normal course . Counterproposals by the opposition parties were turned
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the expert hearing) finally passed parliament in December 1997 because
the no consent by the SPD led Bundesrat was required and its objection
was overruled in the Bundestag.
 
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which finally became enacted there were only few on which, in principle,
no dissent between government and opposition existed (for a synoptic
view of the proposals, see SVR 1997: 103-5). One was to increase federal
the  part-time  worker regularly ends up with 70 percent of his/her former net
earnings which is not much less attractive than the hitherto utilized pathway
into retirement.
16     ) Understandably, the Association of Executives (Union Leitender
Angestellter) opposed that impairment because it largely (and retroactively) took
away an element of the benefit formula that made mandatory coverage
attractive for even the wage-dependent upper middle classes (Handelsblatt, No.
91/May 10/11, 1996; von Winter 1997: 182).
subsidies to the pension scheme so that the contribution rate could be
lowered by one percentage point. When it became obvious in late summer
1997 that in 1998 the contribution rate would have to be raised from 20.3
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proposal in the Bundesrat to put into effect this part of the PRA 1999 one
year earlier than planned. It was agreed upon to increase the standard
rate of value-added tax from 15 to 16 percent beginning in April 1998.
The additional revenues are transferred to the public pension scheme and
facilitated an unchanged contribution rate in 1998.17)
   Another non-controversial element was the only one that (as in the
1989 legislation) represents an expansion of the scheme: Two decisions
by the Constitutional Court demanded to change and to improve the
provision on child-care credits. The PRA 1999 stipulates that the value of
child-care credits will be raised from 75 percent of average covered
earnings to 100 percent, and paid contributions out of covered earnings
during the three-year period (one year for children born prior to 1992) will
no longer replace the value of child-care credits. Rather, they are added to
factual earnings up to the ceiling on contributions (which stands at about
185 percent of average earnings). This improvement implies considerable
and long-term financial commitments (0.2 percentage points of the con-
tribution rate, rising to 0.3 in 2030). The
co-existence of (improved) child-
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benefit with, so far, generous disregards of own income) is commonly seen
as a problem - in terms of expenditures and in regard to inequities among
women after a plurality of female life-course patterns has emerged. Since
an improved data basis to evaluate old-age income security of presently
working-age women will not be available before 1999 the government
abstained from changing cur
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(the Social Democrats already committed themselves to an 
 
earnings
sharing model  [SPD 1997: 11-3], somewhat similar to one proposal dis-
cussed in the U.S. - see Holden 1997).18) Whatever concrete shape this
17     ) Uncontested was furthermore a technical change of the self-regulating
mechanism effective since 1992: If the contingency reserve will fall short of a
level of one-month expenditure or will exceed this target a change in the
contribution rate is triggered which, in consequence, induces a changed
amount of federal grants, net wages and the subsequent adjustment rate. The
reason for an annually fluctuating contribution rate was hard to understand by
the public and, hence, casted doubts on the solidity of the scheme. In future,
these changes will be less frequent because the contingency reserve is
permitted to vary within a defined corridor.
18     ) Another issue not settled was the taxation of retirement benefits (viz.
the exemption of contributions to the public pension scheme and of private
provisions for old age from income tax). The Constitutional Court has required
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reform will eventually take it can be assumed that the scheme will
continue to depart from the male breadwinner model to which it was
traditionally geared to (Meyer 1998).
   The three most controversial elements of the PRA 1999 are the
following: (1) The legislation of 1996 already meant a decisive departure
from the previous conception that sending older workers into (desired)
early retirement is preferable to the (presumed) alternative of higher
unemployment of young and prime-age workers. In order to raise the
actual age of entry into retirement it was deemed indispensable to close
two remaining loopholes to which older worker might retreat when trying
to avoid permanent benefit reductions in case of early retirement. So far,
the option of severely handicapped persons with at least 35 years of
insurance have the option to retire at the age of 60 (and, like other early
retirees, merely renounce benefit increments which would be attainable
due to a longer contribution period) had remained unchanged. For not to
give an incentive to strive for a certification as 
 
severely handicapped  the
retirement age for this sub-category of insured will be raised to 63 years
(they remain eligible to retire at the age of 60 however, but have to take a
benefit reduction which, altogether, amounts to about 17.5 percent
compared to employment until age 63).
   (2) Likewise, a momentous reform of disability pensions aims at foiling
evasive strategies: After 1999, a different formula to calculate the benefit
level will be in place (concerning the parameters how the years between
the age when invalidity is ascertained and the standard retirement age
are assessed). This change makes disability benefits financially less
attractive for applicants younger than 63 years of age. On average it will
imply a reduction of 7.7 percent (at most: 10.8 percent) compared to
current law (Kruse 1998). Regularly, disability pensions are no longer
granted as permanent benefits. And if the remaining work capacity allows
an employment between three and six hours per day only half of the
benefit is paid. Whereas so far the non-availability of a part-job was a
reason to grant a full disability pension, in future the concrete labor
market conditions are disregarded (abstrakte Betrachtungsweise). Thus, a
disabled 
 
half-beneficiary  (or 
 
non-beneficiary  due to a work capacity of at
least six hours per day) becoming or remaining unemployed is referred to
(additional) benefits from the unemployment insurance, and this
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tested in principle
to establish a proper delimitation of responsibilities between unemploy-
ment insurance and public pension scheme so that the latter is no longer
burdened with increased benefit payments due to an existing (part-time)
job shortage. The unions and Social Democrats objected these concrete
reform in 1997 nothing happened in this regard yet. It is obvious that an
appropriate solution to this problem (as well as promoting the coverage of
occupational pensions or additional private provision) will imply an extension of
 fiscal welfare , i.e. an increase in foregone taxes (for a detailed analysis see
Schmä hl 1998a).
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mission to protect against the income risk of disability withering away:
Combined with 1996 legislation on assessing non-contribution periods
and the 
 
demographic factor  (see below) these impairments might imply
that recipients of disability pensions (and, possibly, later on their
survivors) will fall into poverty much more often than before.
   (3) Increased longevity implies a 
 
rectangularization  of the survival curve
so that almost all insured who ever paid contributions are actually
claiming benefits and then receiving their old-age pensions for a longer
period. In West Germany the average period was 9.9 years for pensioners
who deceased in 1960. In 1996 it had risen to 15.9 years (VDR 1997:
112). It thus seems plausible if newly and already retired persons
enjoying more work-free years take part in the financial consequences
when the total amount of pension benefits is stretched over that longer
time period. The PRA 1999 provides that with a time-lag of nine years half
of the risen life expectancy at age 65 will be taken into account in the
formula by which the initial benefit level as well as the annual indexation
is calculated. Thus mortality changes as one element of demographic
shifts are additionally included in the self-regulating mechanism
established in 1992 (see above). In contrast to an increased retirement
age this provision does not spare the already retired from partaking in
retrenchments and facilitates larger amounts of expenditures saved much
faster (and regardless of the current labor market situation). Further
rising longevity assumed, it means that the net standard pension level (or:
 
ratio ) of presently 70 percent is gradually lowered to 64 percent (but not
below) when benefit adjustments will be lower than net wage development
(but there will be no nominal cuts if net wages stagnate). Unions, Social
Democrats, and the associations of the elderly described this stipulation
as 
 
pension cut  (Rentenkü rzung) which is not completely unfounded
although benefits will, according to assumptions on wage development,
continue to grow. However, the 
 
demographic factor  is an effective and, at
the first glance, non-arbitrary device to lower the replacement ratio which
can be publicly legitimized by pointing to the longer period of benefit
receipt. Moreover, the net standard pension level is a statistical artefact
(relating to a fictitious employee who, for 45 years, constantly attained the
average earnings of all covered employees) and says nothing about the
actual distribution of benefit levels or household income
(Bundesregierung 1998: 30 and 93; 1997: 140-61). When the effects of
the 
 
demographic factor  proceed those insured with lower than average
earnings and/or a shorter contribution record might see their benefits
approaching (or even falling below) the social assistance level.19) Contrary
19     ) Assuming that the general reduction of the benefit level down to the
target figure of 64 percent would have been valid already in 1997 a single
 average earner  needs about 28 years in covered em-
ployment to attain an old-age pension that matches his/her claim on social
assistance (Schmä hl 1998b). In case, individual earnings continuously amount
to a basic principle of social insurance
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mize the mandatory public pension scheme. In that case, attempting
reforms within the system would turn out as a reform of the system.
   It is expected that the combined effect of the 1996 legislation and the
PRA 1999 will again substantially lower the increase in the contribution
rate which was projected after the legislation of the PRA 1992 (see above).
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2010 = 19.1 percent; 2020 = 20.0 percent; 2030 = 22.4 percent (BMAS
1997b: 16). The most recent Prognos report (Barth 1998) and the
calculation by the association of the pension schemes (VDR - Hain/Mü ller
1998) arrive at slightly higher figures. Nevertheless, compared to the
calculations carried out in the context of the PRA 1992 legislation the
projected figures express an intensified focus on the pensioners, i.e. in a
longitudinal perspective, while in employment the additional burden is
reduced but after becoming a pensioner benefits will be lower than before.
   The stipulation of retroactive retrenchments and rather short
phasing-in and phasing-
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argument that members of public, unfunded pension scheme are
permanently exposed to politically generated risks (Disney 1996; James
1997; Glismann/Horn 1997). If additionally the PRA 1992 is taken into
account what do the stabilization efforts mean to the 
 
identity  of the
German public pension scheme? Its success regarding social and political
integration was due to the inherent combination of three 
 
types  of justice:
effort, need, and participation (Leistungs-, Bedarfs- und Teilhabegerechtig-
keit - Nullmeier/Rü b 1994: 69-71, quoting Zacher [1991: 42-51]). This
flexible 
 
triangle  becomes endangered if one end is stressed too much at
the expense of the others. Contrary to demands for a minimum pension
(SPD 1997: 9-10) it was exactly intended to strengthen the relationship
between actual contributions and benefit level (individual equity). 
 
Effort 
to 80 percent of the average, 35 contribution years are required to attain the
social assistance level. The reduction of the number of years credited for
education makes it more difficult to obtain the required number of contribution
years, apart from the fact that ongoing changes on the labor market will
hamper a long and uninterrupted employment career. The expected growth of
insufficient benefit entitlements has led to very different conclusions: Schmä hl
(1998b) pleads for an unchanged benefit formula and linking the reference
retirement age to the development of life expectancy instead. In his minority
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Meinhard Miegel demands the introduction of a tax-financed minimum pension
which would firmly forestall old-age poverty (see also Biedenkopf 1997). Thiede
(1998), who refers to the feedback effects triggered by the self-regulating
mechanism, arrives at a more optimistic evaluation of the impact of the
 demographic factor , saying that the lowered standard pension level will relate to
a higher level of net earnings than without this reform element, a not much
higher level of old-age poverty will be induced, and even the internal rate of
return on contributions will improve for younger cohorts.
being documented in a long and continuous employment record and
meaning a prolongation of earnings inequality into retirement has thus
gained in importance. In contrast and although a 
 
standard employment
biography  will be harder to attain in future, 
 
need  (or: social adequacy)
was given a lower status since provisions of interpersonal redistribution
ensuring income maintenance (wage-replacing benefits, regularly
exceeding the poverty line) after retirement have been reduced or
removed. The gradual reduction of the (standard) pension level is a
further factor impairing the adequacy of benefits. So far, the balanced
growth of net wages and net pensions has realized 
 
participation . Due to
the 
 
demographic factor  (and, possibly, the additional inclusion of a 
 
labor
market factor  as demanded by the employers - BDA 1998: 19) the
pensioners will partially excluded from the growth of market income. The
perception of a changing 
 
identity  of the public pension scheme combined
with declining confidence in its stability and reliability to guarantee
 
security  might well be desastruous to the legitimacy of the 
 
cornerstone  of
the German Sozialstaat.
   However, the public pension reforms of 1996/1997 have stirred little
public grievance and protest. This is surprising insofar as (a) at the same
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workers (from 100 to 80 percent) led the unions to organize large rallies
and caused spontaneous strikes in firms which subsequently tried to
apply this new rule and (b) the various retrenchments, especially if
combined, are substantial and effective for the whole period of benefit
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might be that in Germany there are no large and influential organizations
representing the interests of the elderly (comparable to the American
Association of Retired Persons) able to organize vociferous protest. In fact,
the altogether largest elderly organization are the unions, and although
they claim to represent the interests not only of the working population,
but also of former employees and their relatives, it would be a difficult
undertaking to engage in a protest movement cutting across all age
groups when benefit reductions at the same time turn out as an
immediate net wage advantage for employed workers.
   A possibly more important reason for the absence of open protest
should be related to the extraordinary complex and unintelligible nature
of the public pension scheme. It can be safely assumed that most insured
cannot estimate what the legislated changes actually mean to them
personally. Those who are already closer to retirement age and thus more
interested in eligibility criteria and entitlements might be able to roughly
ascertain that they will be more or less exempted from deteriorations due
to 
 
guarantee rules  and phasing-in/-out provisions. An again intensified
intransparency of the scheme can be presumed to have two implications:
(1) As long as policy-makers can reasonably expect policy-takers' behavior
is largely passive and unrespon
  
   \( +	3ﬁﬃ
z%' (3
- Le Grand 1997) their
scope to enact retrenchments with undistinct individual effects is
considerable. Nevertheless, after a dispute among the government parties
on whether to put into effect the PRA 1999 already in 1998 and thus reap
some of the aspired savings one year earlier it was decided to stick to the
original time schedule: Not even granting a small increment if the new
indexation formula was applied in July was expected to set the
pensioners especially against the CDU/CSU at the forthcoming federal
elections in September 1998. (2) Intransparency should be disadvant-
ageous for the development of institutional trust, and the (correct)
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and benefit level while not preventing a higher contribution rate is not
conducive either. It cannot be answered yet whether the latest reforms
have altered the support for the public pension scheme, but one can rule
out that they have very much helped to regain lost confidence in this
welfare state institution because the future stability is still questioned in
the ongoing debate and advice on individually wise behavior is contra-
dictory.
   The policy changes effected by the 1996 and 1997 legislation show that
several of the levers available for directly stabilizing the financial viability
of unfunded pension schemes in view of population aging have been
pulled (see above, Figure 1). The starting point of recent public pension
reforms in Austria, Italy, Sweden and further countries has been broadly
similar. Does this mean that, given a limited set of policy options,
cross-nationally there will be more convergence in public pension policy?
In Sweden, the second-tier scheme will play a pivotal role, and since the
contributory and insurance elements are strenghtened (and child-care
credits similar to the German variant as well as a special variant of a
 
demographic factor  are introduced - Ministry 1998; Palmer 1998) it will
look more 
 
German  in the end. This might also be true for Austria where
the recent reform aimed at tightening the link between contributions and
benefits and, as in Sweden and Germany, a higher factual retirement age
(Geppert 1998; Wö ss 1998) what confirms the general trends ascertained
by Myles/Quadagno (1997). However, if the concept of 
 
path dependence 
is taken seriously comparable adjustments to a common challenge
adopted in different institutional contexts hardly lead to convergence
(North 1990: 101; Bonoli et al. 1996). Rather, mediated by national
institutions which produce different debates and different coalitions, the
expected outcome should be revised diversity. Insofar, only a detailed
comparison of whether the reform strategies chosen express a change of
the explicit and implicit goals of the public pension system and an altered
conception of the retirement income mix could show to what extent
revised diversity actually implies reduced diversity.
5. The End of the  Grand Coalition ?
It could be argued that the break-up of the traditional consensus in
pension policy becoming visible in 1996 is only temporary and largely
caused by party politics because several reform elements were not
disputed in principle. The Social Democratic opposition to the latest legis-
lation and the announcement to undo at least the  demographic factor 
and the impairments regarding disability pensions after a victory in the
1998 election could be meant to strategically position the party in the
beginning election campaign well in time. This possibility cannot be ruled
out completely because the SPD has had a growing electoral  deficit 
among older voters (notably women above 60 years of age). Promising to
spare the pensioners and those close to retirement age from momentous
retrenchments possibly helped to reduce this electoral gap.
   There are, however, good reasons to assume these controversies as
being more permanent: In fact, one has to distinguish between two  grand
coalitions   one between the two Volksparteien, the other between the
social partners, and both coalitions converged at public pension policy
(Nullmeier 1996). As long as the laborist wing within the CDU/CSU
clearly dominated the discourse on social policy development and kept in
check alternative conceptions of the business-oriented wing a formal or
informal coalition between the small circle of experts from CDU/CSU and
SPD was recurrently possible and led to consensually legislated social
policy reforms. The Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, itself a
manifestation of the  grand coalition , contributed to a smooth
development. For long, their concurrent orientation toward solidaristic
notions fostered by the cognitive legacy of social insurance has prevented
the intrusion of market solutions  not only in health care policy
(Giaimo/Manow 1997). The declining influence of the laborist wing
became most obvious when, after the relative  victory  of the Liberal party
(FDP) in three state elections in spring 1996, the business-oriented wing
within the CDU/CSU and the FDP pushed the legislation of the Wachs-
tums- und Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz that offended the unions and
meant the end of the  alliance for work  (see above). The Liberal party
which, due to the health care providers as a large group of its
constituency, had always been most interested in health care policy put
itself at the head of demands to contain contributions to all social
insurance schemes. When the PRA 1999 was first read in parliament
(June 27, 1997), Gisela Babel, FDP social policy spokeswoman, referred
to the debate on the previous pension reform in 1989 when the prospect
of attaining a contribution rate of 26 or 28 percent in 2030 stirred no
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Das Parlament, No. 29/July 11,
1997, p. 9). This quote shows that a  frame switch  had taken place when
almost unaltered and well-known projections of the long-term financial
status were reinterpreted in the light of current economic developments
and a changing ideology. Within the Liberal party that re-evaluation had
gone farthest, and it was able to carry through its more rigorous demands
for savings measures in cabinet circles (Kanzlerrunden) and working
groups of the coalition parties (Koalitionsarbeitsgruppen) which evolved as
informal, extraparliamentary centers of decision-making (Manow 1996).20)
   The divergent positions of the SPD and the Green party (Bü ndnis
90/Die Grü nen) on the one and the coalition government on the other side
thus became more pronounced. In regard to public pension reform they
differ to what extent efforts to attain a higher level of employment (and by
which measures) and further improvements of the revenue situation
should be given priority to attempts aiming at the curtailment of benefits.
Concretely, there is disagreement on which additional burden can
employers be expected to carry, which sacrifices can be expected from
present/future pensioners, or to what extent the role of the public
pension scheme may be allowed to decline so that the opportunities for
interpersonal redistribution according to the social adequacy principle are
not unreasonably limited. The last question is increasingly relevant since
income inequality is growing and more private protection reinforces
inequality in old age and the vulnerability associated with a changed
composition of retirement income (see also Bö rsch-Supan 1997). A
growing gulf between party positions is not limited to pension policy. The
conceptions on the future of health care policy as well differ more than
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(Hinrichs 1998).
   The recent reforms in health care and pension policy clearly show that,
after the orientation towards consented changes has come to an end,
development is determined by prevailing majority in parliament, thereby
disregarding alternative conceptions as long as the bicameral structure
does not necessitate this. And they were, as well as other legislative
changes aiming at retrenchment, designed as to effectively circumvent
expected objections by the Bundesrat and the SPD as a 
 
co-governing 
party. Obviously, this new pattern social policy-making by majority
decision will continue after the new Red-Green coalition government has
come into power in autumn of 1998: According to the agreement between
the SPD and Bü ndnis 90/Die Grü nen (Das Parlament, No. 45/October 30,
1998, p. 6-10) the then most controversial elements of health care and
public pension reforms enacted in 1996 and 1997 will be cancelled.
20     ) It was foremost the FDP which has also blocked a provision that would
have made marginal part-time workers and the  false self-employed  (see above,
section 2.) liable to contribution payments. Both the Ministry of Labor an Social
Affairs (BMAS 1997a: 7 and 16-20) as well as the SPD (1997: 9-10) had strongly
approved such an expanded coverage. Furthermore, a proposed change that
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was omitted in the final law (BMAS 1997b: 61 and 88).
Notably, the  demographic factor  and the changed rules concerning
disability pensions will not take effect. It was concluded to legislate a
structural reform of the public pension scheme in 1999 of which (in
November 1998) the contours are not fully discernible because the in-
tentions are phrased rather vaguely.
   In the past, the Federal Republic has been repeatedly praised for its
peaceful industrial relations. Corporate governance of the social
insurance schemes by the social partners has contributed to preserving a
consensus among the labor market associations  or, at least, a general
willingness to compromise as an attitude of mind. This was particularly
true of the public pension scheme which unions and employers alike
always regarded as  their  institution (Nullmeier/Rü b 1993: 329). The
social partners were actively involved in pension policymaking, and still in
the preliminary stages of the PRA 1992 they agreed upon a set of reform
proposals that, ultimately, was largely taken into account. The institu-
tional architecture of this scheme was completely accepted by the
employers as was still documented in the BDA publication of 1994 (see
section 4.). During the 1996 and 1997 legislation both social partners
were not directly included, and a common blueprint for further reforms
was no longer possible or striven for. Persistently high unemployment and
the final cessation of  system competition  after 1989 strenghtened
1ﬁ &L 1<(3ﬃﬁL%`ﬁ(   '
vis-à-vis labor as have heightened  exit  options
resulting from economic globalization. It has also intensified interest
diversification among employers  between small and large firms, between
export-oriented and domestically oriented enterprises, between  modern 
and  traditional  sectors. The conflict on how to reform the system of
industry-wide collective agreements expresses em
ﬁ>'ﬀU("13)ﬁ>  i(  
maintain unity and cohesion. Under these circumstances it is most
obvious to take a tough position, to present distinct demands which meet
a common interest of all employers, i.e. above all (non-wage) labor costs,
and to signal willingness not to shy away from confrontation instead of
showing a precommitment to consensus.
   Their reinterpretation of the substance of the social market economy
furthermore implies that the employers have departed from the
conception of a balanced growth of all incomes  profits, wages, public
pensions and other social transfers. The latest manifesto (BDA 1998)
illustrates this changed position very clearly: It is demanded to say
4C
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(Lebensstandardsicherung) and to replace it with the principle of basic
security.21) Therefore, they present elements for a further reform which
would lead to a contribution rate of 19 percent on a permanent basis.
Although it is emphasized that central principles of the public pension
21     ) In this regard, the Federation of German Industry (BDI 1998: 76-7) is
more rigorous when it demands a contribution-financed basic pension topped
up by mandatory private provision.
scheme (earnings-related contributions and benefits, pay-as-you-go
funding - BDA 1998: 17-8) should be retained it is obvious that if these
proposals would be realized the principles of 
 
need  (social adequacy) and
 
participation  (see above, section 4.) are further suppressed. As part of a
structural redirection of social policy aiming at a combined rate to all
social insurance schemes below 38 percent, once and for all, it would
relieve employers from the problem to see risen rates adequately taken
into account during annual wage bargaining (see above, n. 9).
   Whereas it is conceivable that the 
 
grand coalition  of parties can be
revived if the new Red-Green government seeks a compromise with the
CDU/CSU on the forthcoming legislation (or, in future, election results
suggest a differently composed government coalition), no easy fix of the
associational consensus on pension policy can be expected. If 
 
globaliza-
tion  shows effects beyond the growth of transnational trade and integra-
tion of financial markets it is that employers, particularly a 
 
new
generation  of executives and functionaries, do no longer cling to the
consensus-oriented style of social policy-making embedded in the concept
of social market economy and do no longer see themselves as stake-
holders in 
 
German capitalism  as a distinct variant. The presentation of
their interests in social policy is coming increasingly closer to the trend
prevailing in the international debate, thereby having been successful to
establish the notion of a reduced protection from the market as inevitable
in the political process.
6. Conclusion: Time for a Radical Change?
Among neoliberal economists (e.g., Habermann 1988; Koerfer 1997) the
notion prevails that the public pension reform of 1957 has been a serious
mistake. It meant a defeat for Ludwig Erhard, at that time Minister for
Economic Affairs and regarded as the 
 
father  of the economic miracle, and
his vision of a social market economy placing more emphasis on self-reli-
ance and subsidiarity, thus opposing comprehensive, paternalistic social
protection by the state (Versorgungsstaat). Moreover, the decision in favor
of the pay-as-you-go principle made the scheme extremely vulnerable to
demographic shifts and, at the same time, most resistant to attempts for
replacing it with a more equitable and economically superior system (SVR
1996: 232).
   Regarding the first accusation, it is indeed true that the mandatory and
almost universal German public pension scheme provides generous
benefits: The public pension share of total retirement income (and even
within the top quintile) is highest among eight OECD countries included
in Bö rsch-
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smallest difference between disposable pre- and post-retirement
income22), and the savings rate out of disposable income actually
increases after age 60 (more than half of the elderly do not completely
consume their annuity income although homeownership is, except for
Switzerland, lowest among OECD countries). Comparatively high
retirement incomes also facilitate an extremely low percentage of elderly
coresiding with their children (Bö rsch-Supan 1994: 317-23)  what does
not inhibit bidirectional cash and in-kind transfers among family mem-
bers living in different housholds. However, although the percentage of
elderly receiving (additional) social assistance benefits has steadily
declined to less than two percent in the 1990s there is a considerably
larger number of elderly whose retirement income is only slightly
exceeding the poverty level. But income distribution among the elderly is
far less unequal (and the income level drops less after retirement) than in
the U.S. (Burkhauser et al. 1997; Schwarze 1998).
   The second accusation is also true: The scheme has accumulated an
enormous  implicit debt  due to the property-like entitlements of those who
already draw a pension and those of working age who have based their
retirement income expectations on mandatory contributions to the
scheme (Chand/Jaeger 1996: 15-8). Even if it would turn out that a
capital funded system is (more) immune from population aging and, due
to the higher rate of return, advance-funded individual-account schemes
are  cheaper  than the existing unfunded pension system, the imperative to
serve these commitments prevents an immediate return to a  pre-1957 
situation and the realization of the liberal version of the social market
economy. Because of the  double payment  problem for the transitional
generation economists have not been able to present an unchallenged
pareto-efficient (  all win ) and thus politically viable strategy to completely
change from an old-age security system based on the functioning of the
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dispel objections related to the inherently different risks and
distributional consequences of a fully funded system applying the  defined
contribution  principle).
   Due to these hard  lock-in effects , the protagonists of a social policy
design within which solidarity is pushed back in favor of self-reliance and
subsidiarity, for the time being, concentrate on a funded non-public
supplement to a more or less radically altered public pension scheme.
Although enjoying much public attention the proposal to turn to a
22     ) This finding seems to be at odds with most comparisons of  standard
replacement rates  GHﬁ?Z:<H 7<H\X<  8J=@I KﬀM)BEa 7 S;>E_?Z: Sb8JMf7J?hXnM 7[:JHf8<I 8YK17 MfX&AGb8J?M!O
overly generous (Weaver 1998, Table 2). However, as long as both spouses are
alive pension benefits out of own entitlements are paid unconditionally so that
a retired couple regularly receives two S);ﬁ!_ ?Z: Sﬃ8JMi7J?ZX9M,7[eqK&Mik	A Hf8?Nl89a 7 SU8<Mf7J?cX&M
share is increasing among the younger cohorts of newly retired. Moreover, quite
often, pension benefits from other public schemes (civil servants, farmers) add
to the total retirement income (Bundesregierung 1997). Finally, benefits from
the public pension scheme are rarely subject to income tax so far.
tax-financed system of basic security (comparable to the Danish one),
topped up by non-mandatory private and occupational pensions, clearly
represents a minority position (Miegel/Wahl 1985; Biedenkopf 1997).
Replacing contributions with substantially increased direct and/or
indirect taxes does not fit into market liberal notions, while the defenders
of the existing scheme especially point to the lack of reciprocity which
contradicts entrenched notions of distributive justice. Supported by the
 
tail wind  of the international debate on pension reform and the trend
away from pay-as-you-go financing, the increasingly influential
alternative conception is to further scale down the existing contributory
scheme. By providing nothing more than a still differentiated floor of
retirement income a lower contribution rate would facilitate enlarged
voluntary or mandatory savings for retirement. In the eyes of the
advocates of this approach23) the hitherto enacted reforms have not gone
far enough to tackle growing intergenerational inequities and to adjust
the system of social protection to changing conditions of production in a
globalizing economy. In the light of the intertwined 
 
party consensus  and
 
associational consensus  being in a process of dissolution (see above,
section 5.) it explains why the debate on the future of the public pension
has not faded after the reform legislation of 1996 and 1997.
   So far, the institutionally solidified configuration of the pension policy
arena has limited the possibilities of alternative conceptions to become
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290-2) is weakened, the political strength of the 
 
guardians  of the existing
public pension scheme and vested interests involved as well as still pre-
valent tenets, ideas and basic beliefs have as yet prevented a massive
redesign, rather, promoted incremental 
 
stabilization  adjustments. The
political opportunity structure for those demanding a fundamental 
 
goal
shift  of the public pension scheme (basic security but, at the same time,
giving less concern to effective poverty prevention; see SVR 1996: 234-5)
and supplementary advance-funded pensions would be improved if their
proposals were more concretely developed. Beyond demands to accelerate
the reduc-
23     ) Beside numerous individuals (foremost market liberal economists and
politicians), see especially SVR 1996: 227-42; Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft
Kö ln 1997; BDA 1998; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 1998. - Interestingly enough,
the economic advisers (SVR 1996: 233; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 1998: 28) do
not flatly oppose a family-oriented reconstruction of an altogether downsized
public pension scheme: Parents providing the indispensable  human capital  to
the scheme should be favored at the expense of those who benefit from  other
Sﬃ89XnSE_Z8La 7p:VHﬁ? _ dren  when the latter are either asked to pay a higher contribution
rate or will face a lower benefit level (see also Figure 1, measure I.4). Proposals
of that kind (adding to already institutionalized child-care credits) have been
brought forward time and again by conservative (but not only christian) politi-
cians and family advocacy groups. They are meant to correct a fundamental
flaw in the generational compact, and it is also hoped for higher fertility and
thus a more balanced size of successive cohorts (Meyer 1998; Werding 1998).
tion of the standard pension level (and to further limit non-contributory
benefits) not much has been said about a new model of 
 
mixed  old-age
security. Neither the financial and distributional consequences are
comprehensibly calculated, nor has been evaluated how the aspired
downsizing of the public pension scheme could be achieved without
violating the interests of the pensioners and older workers or
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"
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property-like entitlements. Moreover, it is not clear yet how to finance the
tax expenditure obviously essential to expand the coverage of
occupational pensions (or a consistent and budgetary viable model for
exempting private and mandatory provision for old age and taxing
benefits when received; see above, n. 17). And finally, those proposals
lack concrete guidelines for a regulatory framework for private pension
funds. Apart from life insurances there has been no market for retirement
income products, and an emerging business would encounter very in-
experienced customers. Because the generous public pension scheme has
suppressed the development of a parallel system of old-age provision of
considerable relevance for a large part of the population and an
elaborated regulation, the situation in the U.S. is clearly different, and
demands to somehow 
 
privatize  Social Security can develop much more
ﬁ><(%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easily traceable transition costs on large groups of the present electorate
should be a principal impediment to translate those plans into action
there as well (Arnold 1998).
   Thus, no consensual agreement on a substantially redesigned system of
old-age security, emerging out of a clear concept on the mix of retirement
income components, the role of redistributive elements etc., appears to be
in sight. The accusations of the public pension scheme as being unfair,
unreliable and unsustainable, however, can be expected to continue, and
disputes about the proper reform policy and the distribution of
concomitant costs will be dealt with more publicly. Since the security of
old-age security is an extraordinary sensitive issue it is well conceivable
that subjective security perception and institutional trust in the public
scheme are lost completely (Mau 1998), thus, leading to the worst
scenario when the transition to a different mix of retirement income is
 
silently  executed: Employees capable of taking additional provision for old
age and, in view of an uncertain level of public benefits, actually turning
to private alternatives will more and more reluctantly pay mandatory
contributions to the public scheme on which they are less dependent then
and when they discover that their private efforts (seemingly) yield a higher
return. This lesson on individual utility maximization learned it might
cause them to disregard the socially integrative significance of the existing
scheme and to tolerate further benefit cuts so that, ultimately, the culture
of solidarity (Hinrichs 1997) upon which this welfare state institution as
well as all other social insurance programs rest is depleted.
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